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This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of duopolies: a revenue contests among the
ﬁrms. Under the mechanism, the ﬁrm with the lower revenue is to pay a penalty to the ﬁrm
with the higher revenue proportional to the diﬀerence between their revenues. In a homogenous
good Cournot duopoly with convex cost and demand functions, the mechanism implements the
optimal outcome when the ﬁrms have symmetric costs. When one ﬁrm is more eﬃcient, the
mechanism leads to increased social surplus under a large set of parameters.
KEY WORDS: oligopoly, regulation, yardstick competition, revenue contest
JEL CODES: D43, L13, L511 Introduction
There has recently been a renewed interest in the theory of regulation for oligopolistic markets.1
This is partly due to the fact that many industries, once considered to be natural monopolies,
are now organized in the form of oligopolistic structures. In more and more countries industries
such as telecommunications, electricity supply, water supply, and health care now consist of
multiple ﬁrms that are subjected to government regulation.
In this paper, we propose and study the properties of a simple mechanism for the regulation
of oligopolistic industries. The mechanism involves instituting of a revenue contest among ﬁrms
with a view to inducing them to expand their output over and above the level that would be
obtained in the unregulated case. An appealing feature of the mechanism is its self-ﬁnancing
nature: the prize paid to the winners of the contest comes from the losers, and hence there is
no need for outside funding of the prize. This avoids the problems associated with having to
tax consumers to make payments to the ﬁrms, which will typically involve further costs and
distortions as well as distributional concerns. In a wide variety of circumstances the mechanism
leads to increased total social surplus (sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses) and hence
ameliorates the eﬃciency performance of the imperfectly competitive industry.
The basic objective of a regulatory mechanism is to provide incentives, at a suﬃciently
low cost to the regulator, so that the ﬁrms in an imperfectly competitive industry expand
their output beyond the level they would choose in the absence of regulation. In their much-
cited work Loeb and Magat (1979) introduced a mechanism that can be used to induce a
regulated monopoly to produce the eﬃcient output, even if the regulator did not know the
monopolist’s costs. In their mechanism, the monopolist receives a subsidy equal to the increase
in consumers’ surplus that arises as the ﬁrm increases its output and lowers its price. This
renders the monopolist’s revenue function identical to the revenue function of a (perfectly) price-
discriminating monopolist, which will choose to produce the Pareto eﬃcient level of output.
Loeb and Magat (1979) did observe that the amount of subsidy necessary to implement their
mechanism might be quite substantial and necessitate taxing of consumers, which typically
1See Mendoza-Contreras et al. (2008), Auriol and Picard (2008), Anton and Gertler (2004), Wang (2000),
Sa˘ glam (1997), Wolinsky (1997), Gradstein (1995), and Auriol and Laﬀont (1992). For earlier contributions to
the theory of oligopoly regulation, see Koray and Sertel (1987, 1988, 1989), and Zenginobuz (1987). For a recent
review of diﬀerent strands of literature on regulating oligopolistic industries, see Armstrong and Sappington
(2007).
1distorts eﬃciency. To resolve this diﬃculty, Loeb and Magat (1979) noted that one could
auction the right to be the monopolist, and they claimed that the revenues from such an auction
would be equal to the proﬁts to be earned by the monopolist.2 Sharkey (1982) observed various
diﬃculties with the implementation of the auction stage of Loeb and Magat’s mechanism.
Similarly, Bagnoli and Borenstein (1991) noted that in many realistic environments the Loeb
and Magat auction scheme might not extract a substantial proportion of the proﬁts. They
contended that in situations where there is no viable competition for a ﬁrm, the Loeb and
Magat scheme would not eﬀectively extract any of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and thus would not beneﬁt
the consumers.
Gradstein (1995) adopted Loeb and Magat’s idea of using subsidies as a regulatory device,
and studied the implementation of the eﬃcient outcome in an oligopoly through a decentralized
mechanism that involves balanced transfers among ﬁrms. Balanced transfers avoid the problem
of having to raise outside funds to provide incentives to ﬁrms to increase their output. In
Gradstein’s scheme transfers among ﬁrms are determined as a function of all ﬁrms’ output
choices. Gradstein did not consider a particular balanced transfer scheme among ﬁrms; instead
he studied, in a speciﬁc environment, the more general question of implementability of the
eﬃcient outcome through balanced transfer schemes.3
The revenue contest that this paper proposes as a regulatory mechanism for oligopolies can
be viewed as particular balanced transfer scheme in which the payment to one ﬁrm depends on
the actions of other ﬁrms as well as its own actions. The proposed mechanism will work under a
variety of informational assumptions on the part of the regulator and for diﬀerent speciﬁcations
regarding the nature of competition between the ﬁrms (Evrenk, 1999). To better elucidate the
nature of the proposed mechanism, here we concentrate on a Cournot duopoly game under
complete information.
The mechanism works as follows: after a production period the regulator compares the
revenues of the two ﬁrms and makes the ﬁrm with the lower revenue pay a penalty to the
ﬁrm with higher revenue. The penalty that the ﬁrm with the lower revenue pays is taken to
2The proposal by Loeb and Magat (1979) is along the lines of the proposal put forward by Demsetz (1968),
who suggested that monopoly franchises should be awarded to the ﬁrms that demonstrate they will produce the
maximum consumer surplus.
3In an environment where demand is known and there is no information regarding the ﬁrms’ costs, and
restricting the set of admissable demand and cost functions such that all ﬁrms produce positive amounts of
output, Gradstein showed that the eﬃcient outcome is implementable if the demand function is a polynomial of
at most (n-1)th degree, where n is the number of ﬁrms in the industry.
2be a linear function of the diﬀerence between the revenues. Since both the reward and the
penalty increases with the diﬀerence between revenues, both ﬁrms are induced to increase their
output. The more a ﬁrm produces the higher the prize it gets if it ends up winning the contest,
and the lower the penalty it pays if it ends up losing the contest. Thus, the total output will
increase, leading to lower market price, higher consumers’ surplus, and lower producers’ surplus.
An important feature of this regulatory scheme is that the increase in consumers’ surplus will
exceed the fall in producers’ surplus, and hence total welfare will be increased. The proposed
scheme does not yield, however, ﬁrst-best outcomes except in the special case of symmetric cost
structure for ﬁrms.
A line of literature that considers relative performance evaluation in oligopolistic industries
is the literature on “yardstick competition”.4 Since costs of ﬁrms producing under similar
conditions will typically be correlated, a regulator may be able to establish industry standards
against which to measure the performance of each individual ﬁrm. Through such relative
performance evaluations it might be possible to extract rents and increase production eﬃciency
in industries. A possible problem with yardstick competition in oligopolistic industries is the
creation of further incentives for collusion. As they are played out against each other one would
expect the regulated ﬁrms to look more aggressively for ways to collude.5 We investigated
whether our revenue contest mechanism leads to a more collusive behavior on the part of the
duopolists. Under both linear demand and constant elasticity demand, we checked the impact
of the mechanism on incentives to collude in the standard framework of inﬁnitely repeated
games with trigger strategies. In a linear duopoly, the incentives to collude does not increase
although the ﬁrms make zero proﬁt when regulated. When the price elasticity of demand is
constant, the incentives to collude increases but only slightly.
The paper closest to ours is that of Bagnoli and Borenstein (1991), who considered an output
contest among ﬁrms as a regulatory mechanism for oligopolistic industries.6 They proposed
instituting a regulatory scheme in which a constant money prize is oﬀered to the ﬁrms that will
be divided between them in a manner that depends on the output produced by each. As in our
4See Shleifer (1985), Auriol and Laﬀont (1992), and Sobel (1999) for applications to regulation.
5For a study on optimal yardstick competition under the threat of collusion, see Tanger˚ as (2002).
6Dixit (1987) mentions the case of oligopolistic competition for a homegenous good with unit-elastic demand,
where ﬁrms compete for market share through spending resources. An earlier work along similar lines is by
Schmalensee (1976), where he studies a diﬀerentiated goods model in which ﬁrms compete for market revenue
through advertising expenditures.
3paper, their regulator induces competition through making the prize that a ﬁrm receives depend
on both its own output and the output of other ﬁrms. They show, through simulations for a
wide range of plausible demand and cost parameters (constant elasticity demand and constant
marginal cost) that their scheme increases consumer surplus by more than the total prize. As
our mechanism, their scheme also does not yield ﬁrst-best outcomes.
Though similar in spirit, in the sense of relying on relative rather than absolute criteria in
assessing regulatory performance, our mechanism diﬀers from the scheme proposed by Bagnoli
and Borenstein in two respects. The most important distinction is that the output prize in
Bagnoli and Borenstein’s scheme has to be funded from outside, whereas our scheme is self-
ﬁnanced. Bagnoli and Borenstein stated that the consumers would have to put up the funds
for output price, and recognized that the cost and distortion from collecting the funds for the
prize is an important issue in any discussion of a regulatory scheme that involves payments
to the ﬁrms.7 The second distinction relates to the nature of the object that is compared in
each scheme. In their scheme quantities of output are compared. In ours the output levels are
converted to a quantity in common units (revenue in monetary units) before the comparison.
This renders our scheme directly applicable to diﬀerentiated product industries, whereas in
theirs a conversion scale would have to be added to the scheme in order to compare quantities
of diﬀerent goods.
Though not typically associated with theory of regulation, another line of literature that
has bearing on the regulatory mechanism studied in this paper is the “managerial incentives”,
or the “strategic delegation” literature. Drawing on the insight that in strategic environments
a principal may gain additional advantage by hiring an agent and giving him incentive to
maximize an objective function diﬀerent than the principal’s payoﬀ function, Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) provided models where they demonstrated that an owner of a
ﬁrm in an oligopolistic industry may earn a larger proﬁt if he hires a manager and, through an
appropriately chosen incentive scheme, induces him to maximize a weighted average of sales and
proﬁts.8 The regulation problem, as treated in this paper, can in fact be viewed along similar
7Though there is no agreement on the value of the cost of public funds, Laﬀont (1996) mentions values as
high as 2.48 U.S. dollars for developing countries. This means that one dollar rent paid to the regulated ﬁrms
ends up costing the taxpayers 3.48 U.S. dollars.
8More recently, Krakel (2005) combines the strategic delegation approach with an oligopolistic contest and
studies how the optimal combination of sales and proﬁts as incentives for managers will change if the managers
compete in an oligopolistic tournament (contest) against each other.
4lines as the problem of assigning by the regulator (the principal) an appropriate objective
function to the regulated ﬁrms (the agents). By enforcing a revenue contest on the industry
the regulator indeed changes the objective functions of the ﬁrms and, as a consequence, induces
more competition and hence enhanced industry performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model studied, and provides
preliminary analyses towards identifying equilibria. Section 3 ﬁrst studies the eﬀectiveness
of the mechanism in increasing the social surplus and reaching eﬃcient outcomes. Then, it
provides an analysis of the eﬀects of the mechanism on incentives to collude in an inﬁnitely
repeated game setting. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the results obtained and provides
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a Cournot model of duopoly that the government might regulate.9 Let xi ≥ 0 denote
the output level, Ci(xi) denote the cost function, and Ri(xi,xj) = P(X)xi denote the total
revenue of ﬁrm i, where i ∈ {1,2}. Let P(X) denote the inverse demand function, where
X = x1 + x2 is the total output level, and let η(X) =
P(X)
P0(X)X denote the price elasticity of
demand at output level X. We assume that the (inverse) demand is continuos and diﬀerentiable
and that when P(X) > 0,
A1) it is decreasing, P0(X) < 0;
A2) it is convex, P00(X) ≥ 0;
A3) the marginal revenue is a decreasing function of the output, P00(X)X + 2P0(X) < 0.
We also we assume that
A4) each ﬁrm’s cost function is convex, C0
i(xi) > 0, C00
i (xi) ≥ 0.
In this setup, we study the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game. The regulator
moves ﬁrst, it chooses the speciﬁcs of its regulatory policy and announces this policy to the
ﬁrms before they make their output decisions. The objective of the regulator is to maximize
9The model can be generalized to oligopolies with more than two ﬁrms, but a duopoly setup is suﬃcient to
expose the basic features of the mechanism studied with minimal notation. Note also that we abstract from the
reasons why a government might want to regulate an oligopoly. See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for a
review of reasons for implementing regulation in oligopoly settings.
5the social surplus, SS(x1,x2), deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus,
Z x1+x2
0
P(y)dy − P(x1 + x2) · (x1 + x2) +
X
i∈{1,2} Πi(xi,xj), (1)
where Πi(xi,xj) = P(X)xi−Ci(xi). In the second stage the ﬁrms choose their output with the
full knowledge of the regulatory policy. The regulatory policy we consider is a revenue contest.
The rules for the revenue contest are simple: the ﬁrm with the lower revenue is required to
pay a penalty, which we will take to be a linear function of the diﬀerence of the revenues of the
two ﬁrms, to the ﬁrm with the higher revenue. Thus, when regulated, ﬁrm i’s total payoﬀs will
be
Πr
i(xi,xj,θ) = Πi(xi,xj) + θ[Ri(xi,xj) − Rj(xi,xj)], (2)
where θ ≥ 0 is the revenue contest parameter, set and announced by the regulator. After the
market outcomes are realized, the regulator will enforce the outcome of the mechanism through
assessing the rewards and the penalties the mechanism calls for and it will make sure (enforce)
that the necessary transfers are made. Therefore, for a given θ > 0, the ﬁrms will be engaged
in a game where each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ depend partly on its relative performance with respect to
its competitor.
To simplify the analysis we study this as a complete information game.10 That is, when
choosing their output levels, the ﬁrms know their own costs as well the costs of their rivals
and the demand for their product; and, when choosing the contest parameter, the regulator
has complete information regarding the industry structure (i.e., P(X) and Ci(,)’s for each ﬁrm
i).11 When it comes to enforce the mechanism, we assume that the amount of output produced
by ﬁrm i is veriﬁable. We also assume that all ﬁxed cost is sunk.12 Finally, since our interest
will be conﬁned to active duopolies, we assume at the outset that the parameters of the game
are such that each ﬁrm’s output will be positive in the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
10In a linear setup (and, for a wide in set of parameters) Evrenk (1999) shows that a less than fully informed
regulator can increase the social surplus by using the mechanism in Cournot and Stackelberg models as well as
in a diﬀerentiated goods model of duopoly.
11As the informational asymmetry between the ﬁrms is not the issue here (and, as this assumption considerably
simpliﬁes the analysis), we assume that ﬁrms compete in a complete information game. Though unrealistic, the
fully informed regulator case is studied because it allows a clear exposition of the logic of the mechanism proposed
and the conditions under which it will enhance industry performance. As we discuss following Proposition 1,
under certain conditions, all the regulator needs to know is the price elasticiy of demand at a certain point.
12So that, the socially optimal output levels can be deﬁned in terms of the marginal costs only.
6(PSNE) of the unregulated Cournot duopoly.13 The exact nature of assumptions that will allow
this will be made explicit in the statement of the results below.
Solving the game in standard backward fashion, for a given xj and θ, ﬁrm i chooses xi to
maximize Πr
i(xi,xj,θ). Its associated ﬁrst order condition is given by
(1 + θ)P(xi + xj) + P0(xi + xj)(xi + (xi − xj)θ) − C0
i(xi) ≤ 0 ( = 0 when xi > 0). (3)
As we prove in the Appendix,
Lemma 1 In the relevant part of the strategy space, Πr
i(xi,xj,θ) is strictly quasi-concave in xi;




Intuitively by changing the ﬁrm’s objective function into (2), the regulator raises each ﬁrm’s
marginal revenue. To maximize its proﬁt, each ﬁrm produces an output level under which its
marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost. The marginal cost is not decreasing in output,
thus, a shift in marginal revenue shifts the best-response function. Less formally, the incentives
the mechanism oﬀers to ﬁrms to increase their output involves both a carrot and a stick. When
θ increases, a ﬁrm produces more not only to win the prize, but also to reduce the penalty it
will pay in the case it loses the contest.
3 The eﬀectiveness of the mechanism
In this section, we ﬁrst examine the eﬀectiveness of the mechanism in enhancing social surplus
in both symmetric and asymmetric duopolies. Then, we consider the eﬀects of the mechanism
on duopolists’ incentives to collude using “trigger strategies” in an inﬁnitely repeated duopoly.
3.1 The mechanism in a symmetric duopoly
When the ﬁrms have the same level of eﬃciency, C0
1(x) = C0
2(x) = C0(x), in the equilibrium of







13With or without regulation, we ignore the possibility that a ﬁrm may play a mixed strategy.
7Using (3), it is straightforward to show that under the revenue contest when each ﬁrm produces







The social surplus is maximum when each ﬁrm produces the output level Xo
2 , which is implicitly
deﬁned by
P(Xo) = C0(Xo/2),
When each ﬁrm produces Xo
2 , the mark-up ratio is equal to zero for both ﬁrms. The regulator
can accomplish this outcome by using the revenue contest.
Proposition 1 When there is no eﬃciency diﬀerence between the ﬁrms, the regulator can
always induce the ﬁrst-best output levels by setting θ = −1
2η(Xo).
In the Appendix, we prove Proposition 1 by showing that when the revenue contest pa-
rameter is equal to −1
2η(Xo), the game has a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in
which each ﬁrm produces Xo
2 . Let us note some important properties of the mechanism. First,
to implement the socially optimal output levels, all the regulator needs to know is the price
elasticity of demand at the optimal output level Xo. When the price elasticity of demand is
constant, say η(X) = − ε at all X, the regulator does not need any data on the cost function;
then, the optimal contest parameter is simply equal to 1
2ε. When the price elasticity of demand
diﬀers at each output level, the regulator must know the marginal cost function to calculate the
optimal output level, Xo. For instance, when the inverse demand is linear, P (X) = a−X, and
the marginal cost is constant, C0(x) = c, the optimal contest parameter is given by a−c
2c . Also
note that if the price elasticity of demand decreases in total output, then the more eﬃcient the
ﬁrms are, the higher will be the optimal output, implying an higher optimal contest parameter.
Second, under the mechanism the proﬁts are lower compared to the proﬁts in the unregulated
Cournot duopoly.14 In other words, the mechanism not only increases the social surplus, but








N is the aggregate output in unregulated











∗(θ)/2), is decreasing in X
∗(θ). Since X
N < X
o, each ﬁrm’s proﬁt will decrease when they produce the
socially optimal output levels.
8paper we assume that the regulator weighs the consumers’ and producers’ surplus equally, but
when one considers a regulator who puts a higher weight on a gain in consumers’ surplus, as in
Baron and Myerson (1982), this is an especially desirable property.
Third, with identical ﬁrms, the optimal contest parameter will induce each ﬁrm to produce
half of the socially optimal output level. With each ﬁrm producing the same output, the contest
will not have a loser or a winner; neither ﬁrm will pay any penalty. Given our assumption that
the ﬁxed cost is sunk and that the cost function is convex, the overall proﬁts of each ﬁrm will be
non-negative in equilibrium. Therefore, in a symmetric duopoly each duopolist’s proﬁt is high
enough to keep the ﬁrm participating when they produce ﬁrst-best output levels. We show in
the next section that this is not necessarily the case in an asymmetric duopoly.
3.2 The mechanism in an asymmetric duopoly
Assume, without loss of generality, that Firm 1 is the more eﬃcient ﬁrm, C0
1(x) < C0
2(x) for
all x ∈ R+. When the ﬁrms diﬀer in their eﬃciency, the social optimum involves either each
ﬁrm producing xo








1) = P(e xo
1) < C0
2(0). The former will be the case, for instance, when
the marginal cost is increasing, Ci(xi) = cix2
i, and the latter will be the case, for instance, when
the marginal cost is constant, Ci(xi) = cixi. If it involves only a single ﬁrm, the social optimum
cannot be implemented through a revenue contest. A contest is possible only when both ﬁrms
are active. When Firm 2 is not producing, yet, it is forced to pay the penalty, its participation
constraint is violated: it will leave the market altogether to avoid the penalty.
Even if both ﬁrms must produce in the social optimum, the socially optimal output com-
bination in an asymmetric duopoly cannot be implemented through a revenue contest. In this
case, the participation constraint of the ﬁrms are not necessarily violated. What prevents the
regulator from implementing the optimal output levels is that there is always a discrepancy
between the output patterns that the regulator can implement using the contest and the so-









2). The equilibrium output and marginal
cost pattern in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly regulated through a revenue contest, are as
follows:
Lemma 2 The winner of the contest is always the more eﬃcient ﬁrm, x∗
1(θ) > x∗
2(θ). In






We prove Lemma 2 in the Appendix. In an unregulated Cournot duopoly, too, when
the ﬁrms diﬀer in their eﬀectiveness, equilibrium output levels, marginal revenues, and, their
marginal costs will diﬀer among ﬁrms (Tirole, 1997, p. 219). The intuition is the same: the
ﬁrms will have the same marginal cost in equilibrium only when their marginal revenues are
the same. Their marginal revenues are the same only when they produce the same output
level. Yet, since they diﬀer in their eﬃciencies, when their output levels is the same, their
marginal costs will diﬀer. Therefore, using the revenue contest the regulator cannot induce an
equilibrium in which the equilibrium marginal costs of the ﬁrms are the same but they produce
diﬀerent output levels.
To summarize,
Proposition 2 When ﬁrms diﬀer in their eﬃciency, the ﬁrst-best output level is not attainable
through the revenue contest.
We provide a formal proof for Proposition 2 in the Appendix. In the rest of this section,
we show that under plausible cost and demand parameters the regulator will still be able to
increase social surplus by using the revenue contest mechanism. That is, under a wide set of
parameters, the regulator will set the contest parameter larger than zero, θ∗ > 0.
The equilibrium of unregulated Cournot Duopoly is a special case of the revenue contest
with θ = 0. A suﬃcient condition under which the regulator can implement a second-best by




dθ |θ=0 > 0. For a general θ, the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal


















where X∗(θ) = x∗
1(θ)+x∗
2(θ). When both ﬁrms are active in the unregulated Cournot duopoly
(x∗
1(0) > x∗
2(0) > 0) and the participation constraint is not binding for either ﬁrm15, we will
have P(X∗(θ))−C0
i(x∗
i(θ) > 0 for both i. Then, the optimal contest parameter is always larger
than zero, if, for instance, the output of both ﬁrms increases in θ. At this level of generality






j(θ),θ) > 0 for each i ∈ {1,2}.
10we cannot guarantee this condition; all we can say is that an increase in θ results in a higher
aggregate output.
Lemma 3 As long as the participation constraints hold for each ﬁrm, the aggregate output














dθ |θ=0 > 0, and, thus, θ∗ > 0.16 Using the fact that the mark-up
ratio for i in equilibrium of the unregulated Cournot duopoly is equal to si
η(X∗), where si is the













evaluated at θ = 0. None of these suﬃcient conditions will always hold18, it is possible to ﬁnd
examples in which the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s market share is large enough and that its output decreases




dθ |θ=0 < 0. Without further assumptions on the cost and
demand functions, we cannot determine when (6) is violated. (In Appendix B, we discuss the
suﬃcient conditions on best-response functions under which the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s output always
increases in θ.) When we know that (6) does hold, we know that θ∗ > 0. Below we calculate
the optimal θ for two commonly used demand functions. To simplify the calculations, in both
examples we assume that each ﬁrm has constant marginal cost, Ci(xi) = cixi and c1 < c2.19
Example 1: Assume, as in Bagnoli and Borenstein (1991), that P(X) = AX−η, where
A > 0 and η > 1. In this setup, one can show analytically that (i) the unregulated Cournot
duopoly has a unique PSNE in which both ﬁrms are active if and only if c1 ≥ (1− 1
η)c2, and (ii)
under the revenue contest there exists a unique equilibrium and in this equilibrium both ﬁrms
are active as long as the condition in (i) holds. More importantly, under the constant elasticity










2(θ)) at θ = 0.








dθ ) > 0.
18By using (3) and the derivations for
dx∗
i (θ)

























































2 are equilibrium output levels in the unregulated Cournot duopoly.
19In Appendix C, we provide the equilibrium output levels and a brief discusssion. Complete analytical
solutions for both examples as well as the Mathematica notebooks for the simulations are available upon request.




dθ > 0.20 Therefore, the optimal contest parameter is
easy to calculate: to maximize the social surplus the regulator must set the contest parameter
so that the participation constraint for Firm 2 is just binding, Πr
2(x∗
i(θ),x∗
j(θ),θ) = 0. The
value of the optimal contest parameter and the percentage increase in the social surplus due to
























Figure 1: The optimal contest parameter, panel (a), and the percentage increase in social
surplus under regulation, panel (b), when the inerse demand is equal to 1/X2.
In calculating these ﬁgures we set η = 2 (so, when c1 = c2, the optimal contest parameter
is equal to 1
4) and we consider values of c1 in the interval [0,10]. But, both the optimal contest
parameter and the percentage increase in social surplus due to regulation depend only on the
ratio of marginal costs and this result holds under any η > 1. Under a larger (smaller) η,
the optimal contest parameter is smaller (larger) and the percentage social surplus gain due to
revenue contest regulation is larger (smaller). In calculating these ﬁgures, we also set A = 1,
but, again, neither the optimal contest parameter nor the percentage increase in social surplus
depends on A.
Example 2: P(X) = a − X, where a > 0. The unregulated Cournot duopoly has a
unique equilibrium, and in this equilibrium both ﬁrms are active, when a+c1 ≥ 2c2. The area
between the two thick lines in Figure 2.a corresponds to the set of parameters under which this
condition holds. Unlike the constant demand case, when demand is linear (6) may not hold: it
20This is due to the fact that when the demand is constant elastic, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s best-response function
is always increasing in x2; see Appendix B.
12is straightforward to show that only when
c1 >
a + 52c2 − 3
p




does (6) hold. The thick curve in Figure 2.b is the boundary for (7), i.e., when he marginal cost
of the ﬁrms fall above this curve, the regulator will always use the revenue contest mechanism.





the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s output, and, thus, the social surplus always increases in θ. Inequality




j(θ),θ) = 0. In Figure 2.b, (8) holds above the thick line. Also note that when
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s marginal cost exceeds 3a
4 , both (7) and (8) hold in the set of parameters
under which the unregulated Cournot duopoly exists. In Figure 2, panels (c) and (d), we plot
both the optimal θ and the percentage increase in social surplus when (8) holds. Note that
when both marginal cost parameters go to zero, the optimal θ goes to inﬁnity, so the graph in
Figure 2.c is truncated from above.
When (7) holds but (8) fails to hold the optimal contest parameter has to be calculated in a
case-by-case basis: under the linear demand the social surplus is a long third-degree polynomial
in θ, and, depending on the numerical value of a, the optimal θ may not be the one that makes
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s participation constraint just binding. More interesting is what may happen
when neither (8) nor (7) holds.
In a linear Cournot duopoly, it is possible that the social surplus is always decreasing in θ.
Point E in Figure 2.b would correspond to such a parameter vector (a = 16, c1 = 1, c2 = 7).
Under these parameters, the unregulated Cournot duopoly has a unique equilibrium. In this
equilibrium the output levels are (7,1), thus, the market shares are (7/8,1/8), and the proﬁt
levels are (49,1) for Firms 1 and 2. The ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s participation constraint is satisﬁed
only when θ < 0.023. In this interval, the aggregate output increases, but, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s
output always decreases. The increase in aggregate output does not increase social welfare
as this increase happens at the cost of reallocating some output from eﬃcient Firm 1 to the














































Figure 2: Only if the parameters of the model lie between the two thick lines in (a), a unique
interior equilibrium exists in unregulated Cournot duopoly. The thick curve and the thick line
in panel (b) represents (7) and (8) when binding. Optimal contest parameter and percentage
increase in social surplus when P(X) = 1 − X and (8) holds are presented in panels (c) and
(d). Panels (e) and (f) plot social surplus as a function of θ at points E and F in panel (b).
14(5) the weight on the output loss by the eﬃcient ﬁrm, P(X) − 1, is at least seven times larger
than the weight on the output gain by the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, P(X) − 7. As a results, the social
surplus is a monotone decreasing function of θ in the interval [0,0.023]: the socially optimal θ is
equal to zero. Intuitively, at E, compared to the size of the market the cost diﬀerence between
the ﬁrms is very large.
Condition (8) rules out underproduction by the eﬃcient ﬁrm while (7) rules out too much
underproduction by the eﬃcient ﬁrm.21 Both conditions basically restrict the eﬃciency diﬀer-
ence between the ﬁrms (relative to the market size). However, both conditions are suﬃcient
not necessary. To see that the revenue contest could still increase the social surplus even when
neither of these conditions hold, consider point F, where the parameters a and c1 are the same
as those in E, but the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is slightly more eﬃcient, c2 = 5.75. At F, too, the social
surplus ﬁrst decreases in θ. But, due to lesser eﬃciency diﬀerence between the ﬁrms in this
case, Firm 2 will stay in the market as long as θ ≤ 0.12. The social surplus eventually increases
and at θ = 0.12, it is larger than the social surplus in the unregulated duopoly. As the social
surplus is a long third degree polynomial in θ, it is diﬃcult to calculate analytically the exact
point at which it may change sign for a general set of parameters.
3.3 Eﬀects on the incentives to collude
In a Cournot duopoly, industry wide proﬁts are not maximal; for maximal industry wide proﬁt
the total industry production must be at the monopoly production level, XM. But, when total
output level is equal to XM, each duopolist has an incentive to increase its production, which in
turn yields higher output and lower proﬁts for the industry. On the other hand, Freidman (1971)
shows that in a inﬁnitely repeated Cournot duopoly, cooperation among duopolists for maximal
industry wide proﬁt may be achieved with trigger strategies for a set of discount parameters.










where δ denotes the common discount factor, ΠM denotes the monopoly proﬁt, ΠN is the proﬁt
in the (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium of the stage game, and ΠD is the proﬁt of, say, Firm 1 when
21One can also say that (7) rules out too much overproduction by the ineﬃcient ﬁrm.
15it deviates from the trigger strategy and produces its (one-period) best response to x2 = XM
2 .
Solving (9) gives us a minimum discount rate, δ∗, i.e., when δ ≥ δ∗ the ﬁrms can use trigger
strategies to collude. Therefore, δ∗ can be considered as a measure of the extent of ﬁrms’
incentives to collude.
æ æ æ æ æ
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Figure 3: The minimum discount factor under which the ﬁrms collude in unregulated Cournot
duopoly (solid line) and in a duopoly fully regulated through the revenue contest (dashed line);
P(X) = 1/Xη and θ = 1/2η
When regulated the ﬁrms’ incentives to collude may increase because the punishment trig-
gered by deviation becomes more severe under regulation: ΠN decreases when the duopoly is
regulated.22 Therefore, when a regulatory scheme does not increase the immediate proﬁt from
deviation, ΠD, it will increase the ﬁrms’ incentives to collude. A nice property of the revenue
contest regulation is that under the mechanism ΠD is larger; sometimes the increase is large
enough that the mechanism does not increase the incentives to collude at all.
Lemma 4 In a linear inﬁnitely repeated Cournot duopoly, the revenue contest regulation leads
to zero proﬁt but it does not lead to more collusive behavior.
We prove Lemma 4 in the Appendix. In a linear duopoly the two eﬀects (higher immediate
proﬁt and higher future penalty) oﬀset each other. In a duopoly with constant elasticity demand
δ∗ cannot be calculated analytically, (Collie, 2004). When we calculate δ∗ numerically we ﬁnd
that the incentives to collude increases under the revenue contest, yet, the increase is small. In
Figure 3, we plot δ∗ as a function of η, the solid (dashed) curve shows the minimum discount
factor in unregulated (regulated) duopoly.23
22See footnote 14.
23As in Collie (2004), we also normalize both A and c by setting both equal to one. As the author discusses,
164 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the eﬀects of regulation through a revenue contest. The mechanism
considered here is self-ﬁnancing and the only role of the government is to observe revenues
and make the loser pay a penalty. Hence, it will not involve high transaction costs. With a
fully informed regulator it is possible to implement the social optimum in a symmetric Cournot
duopoly. Increasing social surplus, through increasing consumers’ surplus, and preserving two
ﬁrm structure and market power are the nice features of the proposed regulation mechanism.
In addition, it does not necessarily increase the incentives to collude even though it reduces the
proﬁt of each identical ﬁrm to zero. Finally, it is easy to implement.
The proposed mechanism may have more appealing features in a multi-period setup where
regulator can increase her knowledge by changing revenue contest multiplier and observing
changes in output. So a multi-period contest, possibly with a rule that depends on the produc-
tion level of recent periods, may be an interesting extension of the research considered here.
Another area for further research is to analyze a market demand where homogenous goods are
seen by consumers as diﬀerentiated goods, where coeﬃcients of prices depends on market share
of producers. Such an analysis may be useful in explaining market share races among ﬁrms,
which is something observed in actual market situations.
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5 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. What we mean by the relevant part of the strategy space is (xi,xj) such
that P(xi +xj) > 0. We do not rule out an inverse demand function under which P(X) = 0 for
all X > X ∈ R+, e.g., the linear demand, but, when this is the case, neither ﬁrm will choose an
output level resulting in an aggregate output level xi +xj ≥ X. Intuitively, this is because the
production is costly and driving the price to zero will eliminate any rewards from the contest.




i(xi) < 0. Thus, the relevant
part of the strategy space is the part under which P(X) > 0. Our assumptions A1, A2, and
20A3 apply to this part of the demand curve and they imply that when P(xi + xj) > 0, we have
∂2Πr
i(xi,xj,θ)/(∂xi)2 = (2 + 2θ)P0(X) + P00(X)((1 + θ)xi − θxj) − C00
i (xi) < 0.
To see this, note that by A4, −C00
i (xi) ≤ 0. For the rest, if (1 + θ)xi − θxj ≥ 0, then, by
A3, (2 + 2θ)P0(X) + P00(X)((1 + θ)xi − θxj) < 0; and, if (1 + θ)xi − θxj < 0, then by A2,
(2 + 2θ)P0(X) + P00(X)((1 + θ)xi − θxj) < 0.
When (3) holds with equality at (xi,xj), we have
∂Bi(xj,θ)
∂θ > 0. By the Implicit Function
Theorem, the sign of
∂Bi(xj,θ)
∂θ is the same as the sign of the marginal revenue diﬀerential,
d[Ri(xi,xj)−Rj(xi,xj)]
dxi = P0(X)(xi − xj) + P (X); when (3) holds with equality, we have
P0(X)(xi − xj) + P (X) =




Proof of Proposition 1. (Existence) When θ =
−P0(Xo)Xo
2P(Xo) and xj = Xo










2 ) is a PSNE.
(Uniqueness) First, we show that when the cost functions are symmetric, the game can-
not have an asymmetric PSNE. Assume that there exists a PSNE in which, without loss of
generality, we have xi > xj ≥ 0. Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply that
(1 + 2θ)P0(xi + xj)(xi − xj) ≥ C0(xi) − C0(xj).
A4 and xi > xj imply that C0
i(xi)−C0
j(xj) ≥ 0 Yet, P0(xi+xj) < 0 and xi > xj imply that
(1 + 2θ)P0(xi + xj)(xi − xj) < 0. Contradiction.
Second, we show that there exists at most one symmetric interior equilibrium, (Xo
2 , Xo
2 ). The
ﬁrst order conditions at such an equilibrium implies that (2+2θ)P(X)+P0(X)X−2C0(X/2) = 0.
The left hand side of this inequality is a continuous function of X, and, by A3 and A4, it is
decreasing in X, i.e., (3 + 2θ)P0(X) + P00(X)X − C00(X/2) < 0. Hence, there exists at most
one X > 0 such that (X
2 , X
2 ) is a PSNE.
Finally, note that (0,0) cannot be a PSNE either, as this would imply (1+θ)P(0)−C0
i(0) < 0,
which, in turn, implies that P(0) − C0
i(0) < 0, contradicting our assumption that without the
regulation only an active Cournot duopoly exists.
21Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the social optimum involves either both ﬁrms producing
xo








1) = P(e xo
1) < C0
2(0).
If at the social optimum each ﬁrm i must produce xo
i > 0 units, then (2) should hold with
equality for each i,
∂Πr
i(xi,xj,θ)











2) = 0. Since Firm 1 is more eﬃcient, it should produce more




2) implies that xo
1 > xo
2. Yet, θ > 0, and P0(X) < 0.
Therefore, there exists no θ under which each ﬁrm i chooses xo
i to maximize its proﬁt.
If at the social optimum only the eﬃcient ﬁrm must produce e xo





2(0) and the ineﬃcient ﬁrm must stay out, xo
2 = 0, then this output vector cannot
be implemented through a revenue contest either. Because, when the output vector is (e xo
1,0)
the less eﬃcient Firm 2 is making a loss (although, it has no ﬁxed cost). Then, Firm 2 would
leave the market and the contest altogether.
Proof of Lemma 2. Once again, in an asymmetric equilibrium in which 0 ≤ x∗
1(θ) ≤ x∗
2(θ),


















2(θ)) < 0. But, P0(X) < 0 and x∗
1(θ) ≤ x∗
2(θ). Contradiction.


































































|J| where J is the Jacobian matrix and Di is the 2x2 matrix that is obtained
when the i’th column of the Jacobian is replaced by the vector on the left-hand-side of (10).
Subtracting the ﬁrst column from the second one and the dividing the ﬁrst row by C00
1(x∗
1)−
(1 + 2θ)P0(X∗) and the second row by C00
2(x∗

















2) − (1 + 2θ)P0(X∗)
(11)
























2)+((1+2θ)P0(X∗))2 >. By A3, each of the terms
A+(1+2θ)P0(X∗), B +(1+2θ)P0(X∗), and −(1+2θ)P0(X∗)(2P0(X∗)+P00(X∗)X∗) are less









dθ > 0 if and only if |D1|+|D2| > 0 where these determinants
are given by |D1| = −(P(X∗) + P0(X∗)(x∗
1 − x∗
2))((1 + 2θ)P0(X∗) + B − C00
2(x∗
2)) + (P(X∗) +
P0(X∗)(x∗
2−x∗












2)) − (P(X∗) + P0(X∗)(x∗
2 − x∗
1))((1 + 2θ)P0(X∗) − C00
1(x∗
1)). To see that
this expression is always positive note that (i) as we show in the proof of Lemma 1, we have
P(X∗) + P0(X∗)(x∗
i − x∗
j) > 0, and (ii) the cost functions are convex, therefore, we have
(1 + 2θ)P0(X∗) − C00
1(x∗
1) < 0. Hence
dX∗(θ)
dθ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider the following trigger strategy for a duopolist in a market
regulated through revenue contest. Produce half of the monopoly quantity, a−c
4 , in the ﬁrst
period. In the tth period produce a−c
4 if both ﬁrms have produced a−c
4 in each of the previous
periods; otherwise, produce the regulated Cournot quantity, a−c




8 . The proﬁt to one ﬁrm when both produce a−c
2 is zero. Finally if
one of the ﬁrms deviates, its best response to a−c
4 is
5(a−c)
8 , with an associated proﬁt of
17(a−c)2
64 .
Evaluating (9) at these values, we ﬁnd that under the revenue contest δ∗ = 9
17. It is well known
that, Vives (1999: 307), in the classical linear Cournot duopoly with symmetric cost, we have
δ∗ = 9
17.




Here we examine the conditions under which the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s output may decrease in θ.
Using the Implicit function theorem, one can show that, in equilibrium, the slope of ﬁrm i’s




Therefore, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm’s best-response function is always downward sloping while whether
23the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s best-response is increasing or decreasing cannot be determined at this level of
generality. Still, we show in the Proof of Lemma 3 that the Jacobian of minus marginal proﬁts
are positive at all interior equilibria, therefore at any interior equilibrium, in (x2,x1) space the
slope of B1(.) is always larger than the slope of B2(.).24 By Lemma 1 we know that when θ
increases both reaction functions are going to shift out. Therefore we have two possibilities: (i)
when, as in Figure 4.a, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s best-response function is increasing in the ineﬃcient




0; and (ii) when, as in Figure 4.b, the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s best-response is decreasing in x2, at the
new equilibrium the eﬃcient ﬁrm may produce less,
dx∗
1(θ)
dθ < 0 is possible.25
(a) (b)
Figure 4: If, as in panel (a), the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s best-response function, B1(x2,θ), is increasing
in x2, then x∗
1(θ) always increases in θ. If, as in panel (b), B1(x2,θ) is decreasing in x2, then
x∗
1(θ) may decrease in θ.
Intuitively, when the output levels are strategic substitutes, as in Figure 4.b, an increase in
the contest parameter has two eﬀects: a direct eﬀect, the ﬁrm produces more to increase the
prize, and an indirect eﬀect (the competitor, too, increases its output reducing the marginal
24It is worth noting that |J| > 0 also implies that if an interior equilibrium exists, then it is unique. This




∂x2 = 0, then, we have
dx∗
1(θ)
dθ = 0. Under whis, (6) always hold.
24revenue of the eﬃcient ﬁrm) produces less to keep price higher. Let us note the following two
points: (i) the indirect eﬀect is not necessarily larger than the direct eﬀect26, and (ii) even
when the indirect eﬀect is larger than the direct eﬀect, this does not necessarily mean that the




dθ < 0 to hold,
dx∗
1(θ)
dθ < 0 is not a suﬃcient
condition.
7 Appendix C: Solutions for Examples 1 and 2
Remark 1: For both examples if the monopoly outcome is not a PSNE in the unregulated
market, then it cannot be a PSNE under revenue contest regulation.
To see the point made in Remark 1, note that the monopoly outcome is not a PSNE in the
unregulated market if and only if
∂π2(0,XM)
∂x2 > 0, i.e., P(XM)−C0
2(0) > 0 where XM is implicitly
deﬁned by P(XM)+P0(XM)XM −C0
1(XM) = 0. In the same market under the revenue contest
regulation, monopoly is not an equilibrium, when we have (1+θ)P( e X)−θP( e X) e X −C0
2(0) < 0
where e X > XM is implicitly deﬁned by (1 + θ)P( e X) + (1 + θ)P0( e X) e X − C0
1( e X) = 0. A
suﬃcient condition to rule out the possibility that revenue contest leads to a monopoly is
−(1 + 2θ)P0( e X) e X > −P0(XM)XM, (by convexity of the cost function, we have C0
1( e X) ≥
C0
1(XM)). Translating this condition into the markets we consider in Examples 1 and 2, we
have:



























• Under the linear demand, P0(X)X = −X, therefore, we always have −(1+2θ)P0( e X) e X >
P0(XM)XM.
26To see this point, simply note that when the eﬃcient (ineﬃcient) ﬁrm’s best response function shifts more




257.1 Equilibrium under constant elasticity demand











η −1 . (12)
As long as the participation constraints hold for both ﬁrms, we have X
−1
η − ci > 0 for both
ﬁrms and, thus, (12) holds as an equality. In equilibrium, we have
X∗ = (












η + X∗). (13)







































2(1 + θ) − 1
η
1 + 2θ
− (1 + η)). (14)
We know that
(c2+c1)
(c2−c1) > 0. In (14), the term
2(1+θ)− 1
η
1+2θ is always positive (as 1
η < 1), but it
is decreasing in θ, therefore
2(1+θ)− 1
η
1+2θ is largest when θ = 0. But, even at θ = 0, we have
2 − 1
η − (1 + η) = 1 − 1




Evaluating (12) at θ = 0, we can show that when the Cournot duopoly is unregulated, the













(c1 − c2)η(2 − 1
η)
c1 + c2




− c2 ≥ 0 if and only if c1 ≥ (1 − 1
η)c2; the term 1 +
(c1−c2)η(2− 1
η)
c1+c2 ≥ 0 if and only
if c1 ≥ (1− 1
η)c2. So, in the unregulated Cournot duopoly a unique interior PSNE exists if and
26only if




This interior PSNE is the unique PSNE of the game as the condition that ensures no corner
equilibrium exists in unregulated Cournot duopoly, P(XM) − C0





hold whenever (16) holds.
7.2 Equilibrium under linear demand
When P(X) = a − X, the best-response functions are as follows,
Bi(xj,θ) =
(1 + θ)a − xj − ci
2(1 + θ)
.
Note that the best response functions for each ﬁrm are linear and downward sloping. The
resulting unique equilibrium output levels are given by
x∗
i(θ) =
(1 + 2θ)((1 + θ)a − 2(1 + θ)ci + cj
(1 + 2θ)(3 + 2θ)
.
The less eﬃcient ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt is given by
(a + c1 − 2c2)2 + (3(a + c1)2 − (13a + 4c1)c2 + 5c2
2)θ + 2((a + c1)2 − 6ac2 + c2
2) − 4θac2
(1 + 2θ)(3 + 2θ)2 .
27